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NEIGHBORHOOD DETERIORATION:
AN URBAN-POLITICAL EXPLANATION

Andrew D. Glassberg
University of Missouri-St. Louis
and

Dale C. Nelson
· Fordham University

ABSTRACT ,

. Neighborhood Deterioration; An Urban-Political Explanation
· This paper sttidies the process of neighborhood detefioration in American
'

'

. cities by examining the forrns of p~l itical particfpation among newly-arriving
residents. and ~ontrasting these with the patterns found among those with
longer residence.in th~ neighborhood.
We suggest that:newly-~rr1ving poor fesidents lack the incentive to register and vote that.characterized citizens of earlier eras.

Absent material

incentives, such individuals r~main l~rgely outside the eleitoraJ process.
Elected off~cials t~ke note· of this non-participation, and develop a patter~
of 1.1perverse incentives,•i in which they personally ben~fit by presentingthem~elve~ to their communities a~ larg~ly pbwerless and ineffective.
able to retain their offices

They are

indivi.dualized benefits presented to longer-

by

term residents, and newer residents respond with apathy toward the electoral
process, rathet than with electoral challenge.
We argue that although

11

invasfon 11 and 11 succ-ession 11 is .nothfog new in

'

'

American urbanneighborhoods, and although newcomers are often of lower socioeconomic status than those they replace9 political processes in the past con'

'

'

tained self-correcting mechanisnis which helped to.keep up the level of public
11

11

services in the n•1ghbo~hbod.

When newly-arriving residents were recruited into

elected
electoral participation as a matter of course by political machines,
.
..·

;

'

.

~

.

'

.

(

'

'

representatives had to take account of the possi~ility that if servJces deteriorated too severely~ the new re$jdents wo!Jld retaliate ~t the poils.
,

'

'

.

. ··,··

..

.

.

•.

.

.·

.

.

;

.

Since to-

..

.

day's new arrivals in. 11 changing neighborhoods" are less likely to enter electoral
politics immediately, elected officials can instead expect such residents to
_respond with alienatedwithdrawal fromtt'1e electoral arena;

They are able to

for
longer periods of time
than would otherwise
maintain _their own p_ositions
. .
I
.

be the case, in changing neighborhoods, b~cause of the grow'!ng mismatch between
_/

2

the composition of the population of the neighborhood and the composition of
the electorate.
This theoretical argument is partially tested with data from the Washington
Heights-Inwood, New York City Ethnic Block Survey and found to be correct in
its predictions about. the forms of political participation among neighborhood
residents.
· We regard this theory as "urban-political," i.e. it is rooted in the
specific political forms of the communities we are studying.

We also de1ineat~

three other theories of neighborhood deterioration, the "national policy decisions theory," which focuses on~incentives for middle-class shift to the'
suburbs. "economic base theory/ which focuses declining economic resources
available to "changing neighborhoods,

11

and "racism theory," which focuses on

the ch~nge -0f racial composition within neighborhoods.

W~ regard these theories

as complementary to our own, but we argue the need for theories of neighborhood
deterioration which examine the specific political contexts of the communities
which are being studied.

Neighborhood Deterioration: An Urban-Poiitkal Explanation

(A)

Introduction

Processes of population ''invasionl' and 1'successlon 11 have· been the norm for
.

I

American urban nefghborhoods throughout their history.

11

Concentric-ring 11 patterns

of growth and high rates of immigration combined to ensure that many sections of
American metropolises would undergo several waves of ethnic change.

Under

typical (although_ not universal) circumstances, these population changes meant
that the existing population was being replaced by newly-entering groups of
somewhat lower socio-economic s'tatus. 1
It should be emphasized at the outset that we do not regard this process of
population change as necessarilY leading to neighborhood deterioration.la
.

.

We

.

spetificallj reject the notion that:in-m1grants bring with them such severe
social problems that decay is aisur~d.

Rather, it 1s our vie~ that forces

external to the population gr_oups themselves play an important role in shaping
the impact of n~ighborhood soc fo ... economi c and ethnic change on the quality of
· neighborhood life.
Our paper is subtitled 11 an urban-political explanation, 11 and we shall be
arguing throughout that vari~bles in the political context effect the impact of
neighborhood change .. But in presenting this 11 political .explanation," we are
not seeking to reject all alternative modes of explanation:

Instead,

an

ex-

pl icity political explanation
is added to the mix .of explanations which accqunt
.
"

'

· for a m~jor modern American urb~n. pathology -- neighborhood deterior~tion.
.

.

·.

.

.

.

.

.

Bef6r~ presenting our theoretical ~odel, we.would like to note three -Other

l. · For a curren~ descriptipn of the processes of popt.ilatio~~~hange in- urban

··• neighborhoods, see Gary Sands and Lewis L. Bower, Housing Turnover and
Housing Policy (New York: Praeger~ 1976). . ·
·
.
la For a comparative study of patterns of neighborhood change, some of which
resulted in deterioration while others did not, see Charles L. Leven et. al.
_Neighborhood Change_ (New Y9r<k: Praeger, 1976).
·
-

2 explanations which have been advanced to account for neighborhood decline w'ithin American cities, partitu1arly in the period since World War II.

These three

explanations (none of which are incompatible with our own, political explanation),
wi 11 be ca 11 ed the 11 na ti ona l policy dee is i ans theory', 11 the 11 economi c ba·se theory, 11
and the

11

racism theory.II

In the first of these, decline and ~andonment are thought of as being the
result of a set of national poitcy decisions which have made.a move to the
suburbs so attractive that central -city neighborhoods become unattractive to
those with economic choices

1

and are therefore ripe for decay.

Federal pol'icy ·

has directli and indirectly subsidized the suburban move, in this argument, so
that many people who would othe~wise have stayed in cities have moved out.
Demand for central-city housing is weaker 11 'therefore, and abandonment of its

ity housing

poorest-qua 1

stock then fol 1ows.

Even sound buildings can be aban-

dohed, if they are in otherwise unsatisfactory environments to those with economic choi~es.
The elements of this i•pro~suburban 11 policy are by now well-known.-·tfo would
.

.

.

poi~t barticu]~rly to the income tax laws. which ~ermit ~eal-~state tax and
mortga~e interest ~eductioris fof homeowners~ but not for fenters; FHA and VA
subsidiz~dmortgages; and. Federal highway construction. Thfs last element is
included because of the role of limited-access highways in facilitating the
infill of suburban land between older arterial routes with tract housing -- the
residents of which can,then commute to work on the Federally-subsidized highways.
The 11 n~tional policy decisions theory 11 poses a nice counter-example to
a
.
.

.

.

,

·.,

line of argumenJ now_ frequently heard among both academic analysts a_nd' the.·
l

general public., -- that public ~olicies cannot work asorigi~any intende~.
,

.

.

The

.

. pro-suburban policies outlined above were designed to facilitate middle-class
· home ownership. were publicly advocated by both political parties

1~ the years

3

... ::

after World War II and essentially ac,hieved this

airn, · The negative consequences

for central cities and their poorer populations, though~ remained for later
decades to discover.
· The 11 economic base theoty, 11:·our second alternative explanation of neighborhood deteriorationi is tied to the "national policy decisions theory'' briefly
outlined above;
.

But while the national policy decisions theory centers on the

.

·impact of population shifts,· th~ "economic base" argument pays greater heed, to
the impact of dee] ines in neighborhood economic bases.
tion, "changing neighborhoods

11

In this mode of explana-

have undergone more s~vere declines in their

local economic base in the post World War fl period than di~ comparable neighborhoods in earlier eras.
Particular emphasis is placed on the growth of structural unemployment
, among the 'poorly-skilled.

The decline in the availability of jobs for such

individuals brings with. it an ob.vious decl'ine in neighborhood spending power
as neighborhood change brings with it an i~crease in unskilled individuals in
the r:ieighborho.od .population.
'

Not only have the types of jobs whtich previous

.

gerierations of s~m1-skilled workers obtatned absolut~ly'declin~d, but the
flight of much manufacturing from central city 16ft bufl dings to single-story
plants in the subu.rbs makes what jobs are available difficult for central-city
residerits to gain access to.

Together, these trends help explain why neighbor-

hood change in recent American history has brought with ·1t more severe deterioration than in the past -- changes in neighborhood class composition have
greater impact on neighborhood spending power tha.n would have been true in the
eras when more.semiskilled jobs were available to working-class immigrants .into
"changing neighborhoods. II ..
Although local governments sometimes engage in efforts to counter these
trends by 1nvesting disproportionate shares of their own resources •fo such

4

neighborhoods, this is unlike1y' to have significant impact.

In the American

economic structure, the relative share of resources brought into a commun1ty

·;s who11y

by governm,ent action, as opposed to· private sector activity,

insuf.:.

·. ficient to counterbalance pdv~te~sector resource declines. - Neighborhoods are
left with fewer ove~all resources, even if local governments intrease their
relative spending in such communities .
.Our third alternative is "racism theory."

This mode of explanation takes

account bf the fact that post-World War II patterns of invasion-and succession
ha:ve invmlved change_s in raciU composition far more frequently than in the·
past.

~Jhi1 e invasion and succession, as we argued earlier, are not new. phenom-,

ena in American cities, the post World War II pe~iod has been distinctive in
the extent to which 11 ne.ighborhood change" has meant race change as we 11.
deed, the very euphemism·llc:hanging neighborhood, i,

is

In-.

often used to denot~ tbose

nejghbo~hoods fn the.process of change from virtually il1-wh1te 9 to virtually
I

•

all non-white.
· Because of segregated housing markets, non-whites are only abl~ to move
into a small numb,er of neighborhoods at any one time. · Existing nei'ghborhood
entrepreneurs and resid,ents may become frightened by this process and leave the
.

.

.

community in significant numbers.

Thus, neighborhood change, when it involves

race change as well, can lead to a far more complete and rapid turnover of
;i

populations than would have bee~ true when changes w'ere more likely to involve
the replacement of one/dominant numerically-dominant, white ethnic group With.:·
.

.

another .. · In addition to rapidity of turnover, racist attitudes among some
service-de11very personnel can contribute to neighborhood deterioration.· Such
individuals may believe that new residents don't !lneed" and/or "can 1 t properly
use" good-quality services, and begin to neglect the community.

Fears of the

impact pf race change can contribute to patterns of non-investment and disinvestment

.5

in a community., thereby obviously speeding 1ts deterioration.
Although these various types of explanation differ considerably, they have
the common characteristic of not.being "urban-political." That is, they are
not tied to the particular political structures of the communities undergoing
transition and deterioration.

As indicated above, we believe that such a 11 micro-

political11 type of theory does have considerable explanatory power.
(B)

An Urban-Political Theory of Neighborhood Change

Mancur Olson argues, in the Logic of Collective Action, that individuals
join, and remain in organizations, only under circumstances of e1ther coercion
or 11 side..,;benefits. 112 James ~I. Wils·on has modified this argument somewhat in
Political Org~nizat1ons, to argue that middle-class people particularly, may
remain active in organizations fo~ less material rewards: 3
Olson s theory, however, is relevant to any explanation of wh_y workinq
1

class p~ople participate in politics, and how rates of wcirkirig-class participation have changed ovei time.

In earlier period~~ according to our argument,

newly-arriving residents in a llchanging neighborhood" had incentives to join
the formal political process~ i.e ..· to register and vote.

This was so because

this level of formal participation carried with it possibilities of "side-benefits.

11

The classic examples of this are the reports of ''turkeys at Christmas"

and "a ton of coal II during the winter.

It is not necessary to argue that every

newly~arriving wrirking-ilass family actually received such beneffts to point
out that a·6eTief that such benefits mi9ht be forthcomin9~ and were dependent
,upon the types of formal political participation described above> would be sufficient to lead such individuals to become registered voters .
... __ _

~Mancur Olson. · Logi~ of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1965).
3~ J~mes Q. Wilson. Political Orgahi~ations (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

6

We wish to further argue that once such individuals became habituated into
formal part,cipation on these 11 side-benefits 11 grounds, that formal decisionmakers, such as city-wide elected officials, needed to take into account that
these new residents, and new neighborhood voters, might use the vote for other
Thus, the formal decision-makers had incentives to provide suf-

purposes.

11

ficiently adequate public services to keep. the new residents
least politically quiescent.

happy, 11 or at

In the era of the welfare state this incentive

Since the modern equivalents of the Christmas turkey or

system has changed.

the ton of coiil are dependent on actions of public bur~auc~acies and not
machine politicians, reg1s trati on and -voting no l anger a re as directly instrumental to newly-arriving jesidents 1~ c~anging neighborhoods as ~ould have been
true in days before the welfare state.

Thus, such- new residents today lack the

side-benefits mot1vation to initially become involved in any type of formal
political activity and do not as readily become habituated into voting.
This low level of participat1on is recognized by formal neighborhood and
city-wide decision makers.

Rather than needing to take into account ho1;1 such

residents mightuse their votes, they rather take into account the low levels
of participation.

Under such a formulation, it is not as immed1ately necessary,

in political terms, to keep new residents of working class neighborhoods satisfied,
since the threat of retaliation at.the polls is less.
Indeed, we wish to argue that in the current period a system of 11 perverse
incentives!' is-at t<iork in changing neighborhoods. 4 ·As long as rates of formal·
-

,

participation among new residents of ethnically (and class) changing neighborhoods remain low, individual office-holders, representative of the area's old
,.·

.

.

.

'

'

4.

.

.

'

.

-

..

.

'

.

.

'

'

'

.

.

'

'

We ·fiave adopted the use of the term ''perverse incentives 11 • from the work of
Norton· Long. See "The City as a Sys tern of Perverse Incent1 ves / Urbanism ·
Past and Present, No. 2 (Summer, 1976) pp. 1-8 ..
1

7
populatiori, can retain their positibns for l-0nger periods of time.

Older

residents continue to vote, so that even when their percentage of the populat1on
drops to relatively low levels, they continue to constitute majorities of those
Under such circumstances~ it becomes valuable for formal office-.

who do vote.
.

·[•

holders t_o pr~sent themselves
.

.

.

to their communities as· power1 ess, and incapab1 e
.

.

of reversing patterns of neighborhood ·decay·.

. 'Assemblymen

0~

If, for a counter-example, State

City Councilmen were widely .perceived as potentially efficacious,.
If it did rise,

then rates of partidpat"icrn 'among new residents m1ght rise.

the older office-holders' positi6nsm1ght be threatened by new challengers,
making ethnic-solidarity appeais among the hew residents.

As long as such

offices· are perceived as irrelevant by the new arriva-ls, however, and as long
'

as they are not habituated into voting by the side-benefits of earlier eras,
the combination of alienated apathy and "rational II assessment of the disut11 ities
11

of votfog in

meaningless 11 elections keeps such riew arrivals out of formal

politics, and permits representatives of the area's old population to remain

in office longer than they otherwise would.
11

We regard this as a system of

perverse incentives, II because it creates a situation in which local office.

.

.

holders rather than seeking repuations for effectiveness, personally gain from
presenting themselves to their communities as pm-Jerless and ineffective.
What are the consequences of such a political structure for the ongoing
life of a neighborhood?

If one were to accept a view in which the urban .

political structure is.seen as an irrelevancy, then the consequences of the
"perverse incentives" just described would be minimal~
-;;

--;

I
:
I

lowered percentage of officeholding among members of newly-arriving
groups,
.
.

'

but woulci 'n~t · necessarily have any ,impacLon neighborhood corid1.tions, -· •·

1:

t

They might produce a

-

Some analysts· seem to reach such a conclusion.

Without de~ling specifically

8

with the process of political change outlined above, Lineberry fo San Antonio, 5
and Jones in Detroit, 6 have argued that there is 1 ittle relationship between the
political power of a particular neighborhood and the _type of services it receives
.

~

.'

from its city governnient. · While the data presented here do not engage directly
with this issue, we would point out that the cities investigated in these studies
are both at- large, politically 11 reformed 11 in str.ucture.

Our argument, of course,

in which

depends on the existence of ward-based forms of government,

the popula-

tion (and electoral) compositions of particular neighborhoods effect 11 who
governs. 11

This is not the case in at-large systems, and the mod!:!1 we propose,

there.fore, shouldbe of less importance in such a setting.

But for ward-based

urban political systems, the pattern of perverse incentives should have an impact
on public services.
It is more common in current American political science to argue the
advc1.ntage of ward-based structt1res in promoting pol'itical access for new
immigrant groups,

While not rejecting this view, we are suggesting that viard-

based structures can pose certain dangers to the political, entrance of new
.

groups.

.

:

'

.

It is our posit-fan that the advantage of ward-based structures (as

opposed_ to at-large systems) depends on the simultaneous existence of a system
of incentives for participation which. keeps the composition of the electorate
roughly in line with the composition of the population in neighborhoods of
ethnic change.
We suggested at the outset that population changes in American urban neighborhoods are nothing new, but explicitly rejected the idea that these changes
5.
6.

Robert Lineberry, Eguaiity and Urban Policy (Beverly Hills: S~ge PubJicatioris,.

1977).

:

. - -

·

.

·

·

· .·.

..

Bryan Jones, "Distributional Consideration$ in Models of Orban .Government ·
Service Provisfon, 11 Urban Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 12 (Mar. 1977)~ .

.

9
need to lead to neighborhood deterioration, even if the new arrivals are of
1ower socio-economic cl ass than the neighborhood's

01 d residents. 11

11

We do

think, however, that the in-migration of poorer people into a neighborhood puts
that community's services under greater stress than would have been true before.
.

I

The new arrivals, having fewer private resources of their own, are bound to
place greater dema.nds on avai 1able co11 ecti ve resources.
arriving population, the move into a

11

For the newly-

changing 11 neighborhood usually means

something of an improvement in the quality of life (and of available collective
services.)

Although long-standing residents may perceive service decline,

newly-arrived residents will perceive service improvement.

(This does not

sug.gest that new residents will perceive services to be entirely satisfactory,
•

I

'

.

.

.

only that services in the· 11 changing 11 neighborhood wi 11 be better than those
avai-lable in theneighborhood out of which
they have just \moved.)·
.
,.

.

As a result of this mix of attitudes among service receivers, attitudes
among service deliverers can change for the worse.

For those with ties to the

long-standing community residentsj the increase in service demands (rarely

coupled,with any increases in resources to meet these demands) means that morale
will drop -- it will no longer be possible to do as good a job.
the

11

In addition,

a_verage 11 level of community pressure on service deliverers tci "do. a good

jobi' will at least temporarily drop off -- the newly-arrived residents, seeing
that services are better than those in their Old neighborhoods, will temporarily
be more satisfied with those services than they- "ought" to be, and will not be ·
as insistently demanding of

11

eKcellence 11 from se'rvice deliverers

exiting resid.ents they are replacing.

!..

'

C,;;

as were those

If one accepts the common-sense notion

_that
one of the components which affects quality . of serv1ce delivery is the
.
'

-

.

,·

,•

.

.

'

'

'

I

quality o_f s~rvices demanded by the community, then invasion and success ion

,.

,.

I

:_:;-.

bri.ngs with it certain particular problems in this regard, as-the demand

for

iI .
io'
11

~xce11_ent 11 services temporarily slackens.
.

.

.

.

a time,

that new residents will, after

ing. services

It can be anticipated, however,

.

al so become dis~atisfied ~ith deteri·orat-

in· their new :~eighborhood.

is open, however, as to

The question

.

-

I

wh~t
they can do about this problem.after deterioration has set in.)
.
-

.- . ch~ngfog ~iighborhoods, the'~efore,. suffer from:the dual service~deHver,y
p~obl e~~ of greater d~mand for ~ervices i~ terms of volume, and weaker demanc1
for services in terms of quality. ··
' Despite such ·str~ins, a healthy political system ~ontain(:~elr,-correcti11g

which all evilite" many of the problems brought on by° invasion .and

mechanisms

We have put particuiar ·emphasis

success.ion.

on

the self:..interest ·of elecled

officials, and their needs to keep an el ectorally-rnobi°li zed constituency suf;..
ficiently satisfied so·that this electorate will continue·
incumbents
.
. to return
'
.
'

.

.

'

..

:

.

'

This opportunity
foy- self~correct1.on ·can erode sharply~ however,
.

to office.
.

.

.

.

when 'the gap between population and ~lecforate grows too wide,. and the self-

a result.

-. interes't of elec~E!d officials·-changes ·as

of elected office.::holders can become "per.verse,
on·ce this gap develops.:. As demograph-i c change fn an~i ghbothood p~oceeds,
office~holders whose political ;base was built on support of ~lder neighborhood Indeed/ the self-intere_st

II

residents will see their possibilities for remaining ·1n office as limited.
Even with a substantial gap between population col)1position and E!lector~te c_om~
·..
.,

I.

.

.

.

.

.

...

position~ the_ new arrivals will eventually constitute
majorftjes of.the
.
.

.

.. -,

.

.

.

Given the:likelihood of ''ethnk~solfdaritY11 candidates,

-·. elect:~rate as well.
..

.

.

. l

.:

,.

.

.·

-

.

.

.

eventually
e111erging from
the new group, the older office. holders co,me to
.
.
.

.

..

re-

1

cognize
that
they! cannotrerriatn
in office
i~definitely.·
An extensive
,P9PU1ilt1on,-·.
:_ ,.
. ·.
.,·_·.
,·
. .
.
.,.,
. ·.
.
' . ..
.
.
.· ,.".
.
. . ,, ·.·_
electorate
,gap~ however,
can postpoije
.·-.
.
.

.

'

,·-

.,.

'• ',

this ti~e considerably.
.
.

.

.

.·.

At its
iin~t - ·
.
.

stages/ s~ch '·an/electedoffic_ial may ha~e little 1'ncE!ntive _tel do m~ctf:()f any~
-thi~g for

.

Ms constitue'ncy, since· he perGe1ves his ch~nces ·br ~ontinutng to hoJ cl

11

office as doomed anyway.
In the interim, such as office holder can retain the support of the re~
maining 0 o1der 11 residents through ethnic-solidarity appeals of his own ( 11 They 11
are coming;.-1•111 the best person to try to keep them out. 11 ) and by the provision
of individualized benefits to the remnant of his older constituency.

Such

benefits can take the form of petty patronage (election day inspectorships are

a common form of this in New York) or

by

the support of small-scale programs

which particularly benefit his own constituency.

(The process of ethnic change

normally contains elements of age change as well.

The 11 older 11 residents of the

neighborhood are "older" in length of time _in the neighborhood as wen as
chronological age.

One

11

individualized 11 benefit an office-holder can provide

to such a group are programs for the elderly of the community.)
·Although older residents may be dubious about the possibilities of success
in keeping out the newly-arriving groups, they are unlikely to themselves defeat

their incumbent office-holders once it becomes clear that the process of ethnic
change is substantially underway. Observation of neighboring communities will
have convinced them that the process is probably irreversible (although some
reseatch shows this need not necessarily be so) 68 and their dubiousness about
anybody's chances for retarding this influx makes them poor targets for insurgent appeals.

Unlike the new arrivals however. older residents have had a

lifetime of habituation :into the electoral process, and they are unlikely to
respond to their feelings of lack of efficacy

by al ienate·d withdrawal.

Thus,

the individualized benefits which incumbents can provide should be sufficient
· to reta 1n. the support of o1der residents, even when they too become skepti ca 1
about such office holders 1 effectiveness in their behalf.

6a.

Charles Leven et~al,
- op. . cit.
.

\.
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(C)

A Partial Test

Our theoretical argument is ,dependent upon the validity of our assertions
~oncern1ng participatibn 1n the electoral process.
In the next section of this paper, we will present evidence on one of the
essential aspects of our theoretical model; our assertions concerning variations
in participation in the electoral process.

While these assertions form only a

portion of the total argument, they form an essential. part ,of our entire model.
Future work will report on the linkages between the attitudes of individual
community residents, as reported in this paper, and the incentive systems which
operate for neighborhood political leaders.
We have asserted that the process of recruitment into the electorate for
n~w arrival~ in changing·neighborh6ods does not operate as strongly as it did
during earlier periods.

Previous research by one of the authors of this study

has. 'demonstrated that ethnic groups in New York City showed considerable
variationin their inclination to participate in political activity, and that
this variation could not be explained simply by reference to variations in
. . 7. Ethnicity is an important independent exp l anatory
socio-economic status.

variable.
In this previous study, distinction was made between participation in
politics by voting, and participation which was more "communal" in nature, and
which centered on involvement in collective activity at the neighborhood level,
seeking redress of (local) grievances.

The $tudy also showed that there was

surprisingly little correlation between these two forms of political activity.
· That ftnding ·;s consistent with the theory outlined in this paper. · Our

7 .. · Dale Nelson,< IIEthnic Sources of Non-Electoral Participation 1n an Urban··
Setting. II Paper presente?d at 1977 Annual Meet1ng, American Political

Science Association.
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argument is that under present formal political arrangements, the incentives
for recruiting new arrivals into conventional electoral politics are weak.
Rather, the entire apparatus of 11 communHy involvement" agencies created during,
')'.

and in the aftermath of the War mi Povertye1 as well as the distinctive political
histories of different ethn'ic groups, contribute to a style among many new
arrivals in which political activity is undertaken through collective "communal"
protest, without concomitant participation in electoral politics.
We wish to argue that such a pattern of involvement is a part of the system
earlier characterized as one of "perverse incentives, 11 because it serves to
deflect such protest away from those who hold formal decision-making power, and
allows such individuals longer and less-challenged tenure in office.

While

acknowledging that protest activity (and other forms of communal but non-electoral·
participation) can provide some community gains, and that some resources are
supplied directly to communal groups from central government funds, (and sometimes from foundation grants), we believe :that the preponderance of economic
resources available for distribution by the American public sector remain under
the control of-traditional decision-making bodies.
-

'

And, as suggested earlier,

to the extent that such decision-makers see themselves as insulated from the
protestors. they have little incentive to be particularly responsive to such
groups.
While these arguments are not themselves empirically based, many of them
lend themselves to empirical test.

This paper particularly focuses on our

hypotheses regarding recruitment 1nto the political process of a neighborhood
as it operates today.

It is usefo1 to conduct this analysis. by presenting a

-_- series of testabl~ (and fa-lsifiable) hypotheses about the netghborhood political •.
'

.

.

'

process which are drawn from the theory we have presented above.

'
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(D) · Hypotheses
1.

For __lQ_\I! SES populations, esp~_~i~]J_y__rriinority ethn1_c__9_l"_l?UP m~ITl_b_~rs,

longer residence in a neighborhood will be associated with less satisfaction
I

with the quality of neighborhood 1ife and services.

Newer arrivals will be

more satisfied (or less dissatisfied).
Argument - We suggested at the outset that one of the factors which operates

to put strain on service quality iri changing neighborhoods is the attitude of

newly.'..arriving residents.

Since many such residents are moving into "changing

neighborhoods" fro~ areas of more severe deterioration, the new neighborhood
(for them) w1ll appear to be an improvement, and this distinction w111 be reflected in their greater satisfaction with qua11ty of services in the new
neighborhood.
2.

After a period of residence~ however, demands placed on service

de-

1 iverers by poor minority group residents should increase. ·

Argument - As we indicated above, class and ethnic change in a neighborhood
puts strain on its ser~ices.

After the passage of an initial period of relative

satisfaction with the new neighborhood (in comparison with the previous place of

residence). the declining quality of services in the new neighborhood should be
reflected in increasing dissatisfaction with its servic~s as well, and increase.
demands on serv1ce deliverers for improved performance.
3.

Older residents (pol itica11y socialized when the political machine was

stronger and more visible) and longer-term cornmunity residents (recruited into
political participatio~ in th1s neighborhood when local political operatives had·
more reason to try to recruit them)
arrivals.

vote more than younger residents and new

Even controlling for age 1 new minority residents shouM vote less
.

.

. frequently than do longer-.term. community residents.

'
/
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Argument - We suggested at the outset that the itrain on services in changing
neighborhoods is nothing new.

However, the urban political process of earlier

eras had certain self-correcting mechanisms built into it which are now
11

11

''

severely eroded.

Chief among these was th~ potential s~nction which could be

imposed by a dissatisfied population with the power of retribution at the polls.
A non-voting population, however, does not have nearly so powerful a sanction,
and the 11 self-correcting 11 mechanism will not operate as before. While our data

do not permit an examinat1on ,of past attitudes, we can compare the political
participation of newly-arriving residents and longer-term residents of today 0 s
changing neighborhoods.

We are suggesting that newness in such a neighborhood

~111 be associated with substantially less participation.
4.

Newly-arriving residents are more likely to ,express their political

needs through participation in "communal 11 (but non-electoral) activities.
, Argument - As indicated above, we do not believe that 11e1t1ly-arr.iving

residents in changing neighborhoods remain satisfied with neighborhood conditions for very long.

After the period of satisfaction (in comparison to the

old neighborhood) fades. such new residents w"il 1 recogn.ize: deteriorating con'

'

, ditioris and complain abo1:1t themo

However, such complaint is more likely now

than in previous perfods to be channelled into purely non-electoral forms.

Without the channels of recruitment into electoral politics \A1hich operated in
the past, but with a considerable array of non-electoral

11

community action"

organizations presenting opportunities for protest. newer residents who are
dissatisfied with neighborhood conditions and who seek a forum for expressing
such grievances are more likely tobe led into 1non-electoral forms.

We are not

suggesting that Older residents wi11 not use forms of political activity in
addition -to voting, but rather that such residents~ if they do participate in
-

protest actiyity, are far less likely

to

do so \'Jithout simultaneously ,being,
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involved in electoral politics as well.

5.

In addition to predictfng such a variation on the basis of length of

neighborhood residence, we would also expect to find variation among ethnic
groups

as

well.

Argument - Previous research has shown that ethnicity is an important (and
independent) explanatory variable in accounting for differences in forms of
po1iticc;1l participation~

Minority-group members are more likely than white

ethnics, we hypothesize, to be drawn into the communai, but non-electoral style.
One reason for this variation, is that these groups were the target populations

for organizations begun during the War on Poverty which reinforced such styles.
Although predicting a variation between whites and non-whites, we also
expect variation among minority ethnic grou'ps as well.

t~e would anticipate

that the 'pattern described in hypothesis five to be less true for blacks than

for ether minority ethnic groups.

Argument~ The civil-rights activism of the 1960'~ especially but not

excludvely in the South, put considerable emphasis on access to the franchise.
This emphasis should '"spill over 11 into communities without exp1 ici t hi stories

of denial of the right to vote.

A'lthough

we have suggested that local elected

of-ricials of changing neighborhoods have little incentive to register new
arrivals, the national black civil-rights movement, and pubiicity about its.

voter-registration efforts, served as a partial substitute voter recruitment
device for some blacks.

The. following sections of this paper present our data on each of these .

hypotheses.

We will then discuss certain counter-arguments which have been

advanced,, and comment on the imp 1i cations of our findings for further studies
·, of the process of riei ghbo.rhood change in American cities.
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(E) Data Base and.Research Site
The data base for examining the hypotheses stated above 1s a 1973 survey
of 466 residents of the Washington Heights-Inwood section of Manhattan.8

Manhattan in general ~nd-Washington Heights~Inwood in particlllar provide useful
locales for tes:ting the hypotheses
..

;

•

of

this study.

Washington Heights-Inwood,

'

a ''neighborhood11 of appro.ximate:iy 200,000 residents occupying the northern tip

of Manhattan~ is a good example of a New York City neighborhood undergoing
: ..

'

.

:

rapid class and ethnic changes

'

.

.

in the

past several decades.

Although whites

(mostly Jews and Irish) stil 1 constitute approximately half of the area~~

population, they tend to be much older than minority group residents.

Data

from one study of the neighborhood show that 47% of the Jewish and 50% of the
Iris.h residents were. 60 years· or older~

By way of contrastll only 32% of the

blacks and 6% of the hispanics were 60 years of ~ge or o1der~ 9

N6t ~urpris-

ingly, the.older white residents comprise an inordinately large percentage of
the longer-term residents of the area.

8.

A full 64% of the whites in the Ethnic

One of the present authors; Dale Nelsons was codirector of the surveys
which was part of the Ethnic Block Project of the New York City Neighborhood Study, and was conducted under the auspices of the Bureau of Applied
Social Research at Columbia UniversHy. · The New York City Neighborhood
Study was funded by Grant #GI--:324-27, Advanced Productivity Research and
Technology Division of the Research Applied to National Needs Division
(RANN), National Science Founda~ion.

Although the survey data to be analyzed were not collected in order to
test the th'epry presented in this paper I the EtHni c Block Survey does ·
contain many relevant variables for our purposes. For example, it in-

~ludes questions on ethnic, class and other demographic £haracteristics
• of respondents. . In addition, data were collected on ·1 ength of neighborhood residence, sat.isfaction/dlssatisfactjon with the neighborhood in
general, and a number of questions tap the nature and extent of political
. partidpat1o_n. The survey datap then~ provide a wealth of information
· for examining possible sourc~.s. of support for the system· of "perverse incenfi ves II described in OU\" theory.
.
..
..
.·.. . ·.
. .
9~ This, and all subsequent data reported on in this paper ·are drawn from the
Washington Heights-Inwood Ethnic Block Survey.

I
I
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Block Survey had lived 1n the neighborhood for 15 or more years, while 25% of
,I

th~ blacks and o~ly-9% of the hispanics had a similar resid~ntial status.

On

the other end of the scale, 33% of the blacks and· 60% of the hispanics lived
in the neighborhood less than 5 years, while ohly 21% o~ t~e whites in the
sample-were similarly new arrivals~
The changing ethnic character of the neighborhood has also meant rapid
decline in the average SES 1eve1s of neighborhood residents.

While 76% of

Jewish respondents in the survey and 58% of the Irish respondents had what
could.be termed middle class (white collar) occupations, this was true for
only 37% of the blacks, 26% and 27% of the Cuban and Puerto Rican respondents,
and 15% of the Dqmjnicans.
Washington Heights~Inwood, then, exemplifies well the meaning of the concept

11

changi_ng neighborhood"~ thus~ we would expect the th~ory presented in

this paper (and the h.Ypotheses derived from it) to be supported

by

our data.

(F) Analysis
.

.

Hypothesis #1:

For low SES populations, especially minority ethnic group

members, longer residence in a neighborhood wi11 be ~ssociated with less
.

.

New arrivals

satisfaction with the quality of neighborhood life and services.
to the neighborhood wi_ll be more satisfied (or less dissatisfied).

As argued earlier, for the newly arriving population the move into a
.

.

.

.

.

.

"•

.

.

.

:

'.

changing neighborhood usually means. something of an improvement in the quali.ty
of life ~nd ~f available

collect1ve resources. But

even

when there is no

objective basis for b.elieving that the nelt'J neighborhood is better, "cognitive
dissonance theory 11 wou1d suggest than many new arrivals will be favorably disposed toward their
.

neW

home-; otherwise they would. face the dilemma of having . ·

.

made the wrong choice in movi_ng. Respondents in th~ Ethnic Block Study were
11

•

11

'

•••

'

I

•

asked-in an open-end~d format what they liked and disliked .about their neighborhood.

19
From their responses; an overall three-point 11 neighbQrhood satisfaction index"
was constructed, ranglng from

11

negative" to

results for all respondents by their length

11

positive."

Table lA reports the

of neighborhood

residence.

Table 1A
Orientation to Neighborhood by Length
of Neighborhood Residettce (N=434)
(in percentages)
Neighborhood
Orientation

.
•

16 + years

0-5 years

6-15 years

positive

56.9

55.3

39.9

neutral

23.3

27.2

29.1

negative

19.8

17.5

31.0

100% (114)

~00% (172)

100% (148)

The data in Table lA support our expectation that new arrivals wil 1 be more

satisfied than longer-term residents with their neighborhood~ with the greatest
.

.

differences existing between those who have lived in the neighborhood 15 years

or less, and those with 16 or more years

in

residence.

About 56% of the former

exhibit positive feelings while only about 40% of the latter do so.

On the

other end of the scale, about 18% of the newer arrivals express an essentially
negative orientation to the neighborhoodp while 31% of the long term residents
are negative.
Because the hypothesis singles out minority group members as befog increas- .
.

.

fogly negative toward their neighborhood as time goes by, Table 1B provides for•

. comparison between whites and minorities of the relationship between length of
residence and.neighborhood sat1sfactfon.
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Table 1B
Orientation to Neighborhood by length of
Residence, Controlling for Ethnicity (N=434)
( in percentages)
Neighborhood
Oiientation

Whites*
0-5' rs 6-15 ~~s 16 + rs

0-5

positive

57.9

71.4

43.1

56.7

50.0

28.1

neutral

36.8

17. 9 .

27,6

19.4

30.2

34.4

negative

5.3

. 29 .3

23.9

19.8

37.5

100% (134)

100% (86)

10.7

_100% (38)

100% (28) 100% (116

rs

Minorities**
6-15 rs

16 + rs

100% (32)

* Includes 69 Jews, 58 Irish, an.d 55 other White Europeans

** Includes 63 Blacks, 78 Cubans~ 61 Dominicans, and 50 Puerto Ricans
Table 1B provides interesting data to interpret· in light of our hypothesis
·.

._

.

about levels of neighborhood satisfaction.

Firsti whereas both white and·minor,-

ity new arrivals are about equal in 'positive affect toward the neighborhood,
new minority arrivals exhibit higher negative attitudes than whites (23.9% to
5.3%, respectively).

It

may be that internal racial segregation in the neigh-

borhood and/or the communal and political dominance of whites lead newly
arriving whites to perceive the neighborhood as 11 stable. 11 Some minority new
arrivals may react negatively to a ghettoization. process similar to that
existing in. their previous neighborhoods.

Initially, at any rate, as length

of residence increases whites become more rather than less positively disposed
to the neighborhood, while minorities become less positive (or more accurately.
focreasingly neutral).

Thus., 7L4% of the whites living in the rietghborhood

6

to 15 years have a positive attitude toward the neighborhood, corppared to only
58% of the newly arriving whites.

For minorities. among the very recent

arrivals 56.7% are positive while only 50% of those fo the 6 to 15 year range

21
are positive.

lastly,· 1onger.:term white residents (i.e., those residing for

.

.

.

.

.

15 or.more years) are ~uch more positive.toward the neighborhood than longer~
term minority residents (i.e.,.43,1%to 28.1%, respectively).

·of

Similarly, 37.5%

the 1ong \erm minority. r~sidents are negatively disposed.while 29. 3% of the

long term whites exhibit negative attitudes.

Overall, minority group residents'

attitude toward the neighborhood fit the pr~dictions made in Hypbthes1s #1.
For instance,

as

length of residence·increases~ satisfaction with the quality

of life and services declines for minorities. · That this pattern is not an
inherent component of longer residence in·a neighborhood can be seen by contrasting the findings for minority residents with those for whites.

Whites do

not· demonstrate the steady dec1 ine in positive feelings toward the neighborhood
so clearly associ.ated with longer, residence for minorities.·
.!:!.Y£9thes'is #2:

As length of residence in the ne~ghborhood increases, demands

p1aced on service de 11 vers by poor minority group residents will a1so increase.
After the fnitial high satisfaction with the neighborhood decliries and as
familiarity with private and pub1iC institutions improves, we expect minority
group members to make greater demands on public service delivers.' In particular,

a rise in

11

communal II nonelectoral participation is predicted.

By

11

communal II we

mean that the individual participant.is acting in concert with (or on behalf of)
members of the wider corrmunity.
that fall under the r.ubric
'

11

At the neighborhood level there are many acts

comrriuna1 political participation."

Four of them

.

. .

are examined: contacting .public officials ~r agencies about ne.ighborhood pro-

.

.

.

bl ems,. signi11g neighborhood petitions,. attending community protest meetings, and
joining community organizations to c\eal with neighborhood problems.

Table 2A

reports the percentage of respondents who have performed at least one of these
four cornmuna 1 acts by 1ength of residence in the neighborhood, contra 11 i ng for

..

ethnic background:
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·rable 2A
Ever a Communal Participant by Length of
Neighborhood Residente, Controlling for ·
Ethnicity (N=434) (in percentages)
Whites
Communal
Partici ant 0-5 rs 6-15 rs

16 •f'

rs

rs

0-5

Minorities
6-15 rs

16 + rs

Yes

50.0

50.0

54.3

35.8

40.7

53.1

No

50.0

50.0

45.7

64. 2

59.3

46.9

100%(134)

100%(86)

100%(38)

100%(28)

100% (116)

100%( 32)

The data in Table 2A tend to support the assertion made in Hypothesis #2
that th~ longer the l~hgth of tesidence the greater the level of d~mands placed
on public service delivers.

While orily about 36%of the minority new arrivals·
.

.

have performed at least one communal act, approximately 53% of those r_esiding
in the neighborhood for 16 years or more are cmrmuna1 activists. It should also
be noted that long term minority residents are just as likely to be communal
activists as long term white residents.

However~ once again there are signifi- ·

cant differences between whites and minorities.

Unlike minority residents,

length of residence has little or no impact on levels of communal political

activity for whites -- that is9 newly arriving whites are about equally likely
.

.

to perform at least one communal act as .long term white residents.

And although

our theory does not predict white--:minority differences it is interesting to note
that Hypothesis #2 is confirmed only for minorities. ·
The gross distinction made between whites and minorities: in Table 2A
actually glosses over important differences between minority groups in the im"

pact that length of residence has on their communal participation.

Examining

the re1at1onship between length of residence and communal participat1on separately for blacks and hispanics highlights such minority group differences:
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Table 2B
Ever a Communaf Participation by Length of
Neighborhood Residence, Cpntro11ing for
Minority Group Membership (N=252)
Communal
• Partici ant

0-5 . rs

Yes

52.4

No

47.6
100%(21)

Blacks
6-15 rs

Hispanics.
6-15 rs

16

yrs

16 + rs

0-5 rs

. 61.5

56.3

32.7

31.7

50.0 .

38.5

43.7

67.3

68.3

50.0

100%(26)

100%(16)

100%(113) 100%(60)

+

100%(16)

The data in Table 2B demonstrate clearly the strong communalist nature of
black participation.

Although hispanicsare at similar SES levels to blacks,

their communal activity is lower than blacks, ·even when length of residence is
controlled.

Blacks also exhibit higher levels of communal participation than·

whites (see 'fable 2A above) at all three levels of length of residence.

These

.

,·

high levels of communal participation among blacks. when compared both to whites
.and hispanics, would seem to suggest a strong impact for Great Society programs
on the style of black.political participation.
Internal ethnic variation notw·ithstanding. it is clear that the data presented in the above two tables provide strong support for Hypothesis #2.

That

overall demand for public services increases with length of.neighborhood re~
sidence among minorities can be concluded with confidence.
Hypothesis #3:

Older residents and longer-term community residents vote more

than younger residents and new arrivals ... Even when controlling for·age~ new
minority group residents will vote less frequently than do longer term residents (minority or white).
As discussed earlier, newly arriving poor ethn,c groups no longer have the
incentives that white neighborhood residents had to vote and participate
electoral politics in general.

in

Earlier residents were·attracted to electoral·
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politics by "side benefits" (potential or actual) under the control of pol itica1
machines.

Once habituated into voting, longer-term white residents continue to

vote at much higher rates than other residents.

Thus we expect both age and

length of neighborhood reside~ts to have a strong positive association with
.

.

local voting levels.

Furthermore, if our thesis about the effects of being

socialized to·neighborhood participation is correct, longer-term residents
should vote more often than new arrivals ;ven whe~ age is held constant -- that
is, length of residence should have an independent effect on local voting.
Respondents of the Ethnic Block Survey were asked whether they had voted
in a local elecHon in the past few years as a means of dealing with neighborhood problems.

Table 3A presents evidence for the first part of Hypothesis #3,

namely that age is positively associated with local level voting.

(Due to

citizenship restrictions. on voting, only American citizens are included in the
tabie}:

Table 3A
Voted in Recent Loca 1 Elect ion
By Age (N=326) (in %)
.

Voted

18-29 tears

30-59 years

60 + iears

Yes

55.8

75.2

86.4

No

44.2

24~8

13.6

100% (77)

100% (161)

100% (88)

Gamma= .451
A

strong linear association between age and voting can be observed in Table

3A above.

The strength of the association is indicated by the size of the

gamma (.451).

Particularly strong is the difference between young and old

residents: only 56% of the former and 86% of the latter have voted in a recent
election.

Older residents, then, are much more likely than younger residents

I

! I
• I

Ii

I I
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I

!

I

;!

to vote.·
In Table 3B below.the relationship between length of residence and voting

i

is explored .. Again, non-citizens are excluded from the table:

!
' I

Table 3B
Voted in Recent Local Election
By Length of Neighborhood Residence
. ·

i

.· {N==326) (in, %)

i

Voted

0-5 years

Yes

59.6

68.2

85.7

No

40.4

31.8

14 .. 3

6-15 years

· 100% (94)

100% (85)

16 + years

100% (147)

Gamma. = · • 454
Based on the evidence in Table 3B the second part of Hypothesis #3 can
also be confirmed. Long-terin residents are considerqbly more likely to vote
.

.

than newly arriving citizens; ·Approximately 86% of the long term residents
have recently voted, whereas only about 60% of the new arrivals have done so.
The positive gamma of .454 indicates how strong the association is.

But the

fact that age and lenght of residence are ~trongly correlated with each other
(Pearson's r

=

~55) suggests the possibility that the relationship between lengt~

of residence and voting is sp~rious, i.e., due solely to the· correlation between
age and length of residence.

Table 3C presents data to test for possibl~ spur-

iousness by examining the relationship between length of residence and voting
when age is held constant.
analysis.

Again on1y U.S. citizens are included in the

, I
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Table 3C
Voted in Recent Local ~1ect1on by
Length of Neighborhood Residence,.
Holding Age Constaht {N~326) (in%)
18-29 yrs old ·

· 30-59 yrs old

60

+ yrs

o1d

Q-15 yrs

16·+ yrs

0-1& yrs

16 + yrs

0~15 yrs

Yes

49.2

81.3

70.4

82.5

75.0

89.7

No

50.8

18.8

29.6

17.5

25.0

10.3

Voted

100%(61)

100%(98)

100%(16)

Part. Gamma * ..634

100%(63)

· 100%(20)

16 + yrs

100%(68)

Part.
Gamma=.488
'·

Part. Gamma=.329

The results of Tab·I e 3C strongly suggest that the association between
voting and length of neighborhood residence was a true rather than spurious
one.

Age exhibits aspeciffcation effect on length of residence.

Specifically,

the table shows that length of residence effects the voting rates ·of young
~e~_p-~~_111g_!'~--~-h-~-'1.~f_!lj_~clJ_~_-:-~ged people and somewhat more than_ older peopl.e.__ But in
.

'

'

none of th·e three age categories is length of residence unrelated to voting.
Thus, despite the age of an 1ndiv{dual, the longer one resid~s in the neighborhood the more likely one is to vote.

The third part of Hypothesis #3, then,

is confirmed by our data.

Hypothesis #4:

Newly arriving minority residents are more 1ike1y to express
.

.

'

their pol itica1 needs through participation in "communal" rather than electoral ·
activities.

Although' they may participate in communal activities, longer-term

white residenti are.less likely

t6

do so wtth9ut simultaneously being involved

in electoral politics as well.

The theoretical argument underlying this hypothesis is that a "communal"
participation s_tyle has been nurtured and reinforced during the War on Poverty
period of the 1960 1 s and early 1970 1 s.

We therefore expect minority participants
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to place greater emphasis on communal activity than voting.

While older white

residents may also participate heavily in communal activity, they are much more
likely to vote than minority group members.

Since Washington Heights-Inwood is

a 11 changing neighborhood" the influx of minorities into the neighborhood, is
likely to depress rieighborhood voting rates and consequently to decrease pressure on elected officials to respond to new service demands.

The system of

"perverse incentives" is thus supported (or at least not countered) because
elected officials are relatively free to present themselves as "powerless" to
their constitutents without fear that new minority residents wi 11 vote them out
of office .. While communal participation may lead to some improvements in the
quality of neighborhood serv_ice-:,delivery~ we openly question whether communal,
participation is sufficient to hold elected officials accountable.·
Tabl.e 4A provides evidence to'support our assertion that, among newer
arrivals,participation tends to be communal rather than electoral in style.
The dependent variabl~ 11 partitipat1on pattern 11 ,~s composed of three categories:
1. those who participate in communal activity but do not vote, 2. voters who do

not participate in communal activity, and 3~ those who vote and participate
communal activity.

in

Nonpart1cipamts (i.e. s those who neither vote nor participate

communally) and aliens are excluded from Table 4A:

Table 4A
Participation Patterns Among Community Activists

By Length of Neighborhood. Residence {N=267) ( in %)

Participation
Pattern

·o-5 years

Communal Only

16.4.

12.1

6.0

Voting Only

29.9

36.4

40.3

Communal + Vote

56.7

51.5

53.7

· 6-15 years

16 + years

I

100% (67}

I
i

I
. ..I

I.
I

100% (66)

100% (134)

28

The results in Table 4A len'd support to the first part of Hypo.thesis #4,
i.e., longer term residents tend to specialize more in voting than new ·arrivals.
Abouf40% of those activists living in the neighborhood.for more than 15 years
are voting specialists, while only 6% of such reside-nts are communal specialists.
- On the other hand, of the newly arriving activists about 16% are communal
specialists while only about 27% are voting specialists.

However, among new

arrivals voting specialists st11_1 outnumber thefr.comrnunalist counterparts, so
the data do not fully support the hypothesis.
The main thrust of Hypothesis #4, though, focuses on minority groups.

That

is, newly arriving minority groµp members are expected to place greater emphasis
on communal activity, and for there to be fewer longe.r-tenn minority residents
who specialize in voting when compared to whites.

Thus, in Table 4B the rela-

tionship between ethnic group membership and participation style is displayed,
and again includes only U.S. citizens and community political participants:
Table 4B .

.

Participation Patterns Amo_ng Community Activists
By Ethnic Group Membership (N=267) (in %)

Parti ci pat ion
Pattern

Whites

Minorities

Communal Only

5.1

17.3

Voting Only

40.1

30.0

Communal + Vote

54.8

· 52. 7

100% (157)

100% (110)

Although the relationship is only.a moderate one, Table 48 does ~how that
white acttvists are more likely to specia11ze in voting and les~ likely to b~
communal spec1alists than minority group members.

Thus, the first part of

Hypothesis #4 is supported, but the evidence is not part1cularly strong.
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The combination of ethnic group membership and length of residence may
provide insights into participation styles that neither can contribute
separately'. Ourhypothesis states that newly arriving minority group members
will be more likely to exhibit a communal style than whites (newly arrived or
long-term residents).

Table .4C· presents the relationship between length of

neighborhood residence and participation style, controlling for ethnic group
membership.

As before, Table 4C includes only

w.s.

citizens and political

pa rt i ci pants.
Table 4C

. I

Participation Patterns Among Community Activists
By Length of Neighborhood Residence, Controlling
For Eth~ic Group Membership (N=267)
Whites
0-5 rs 6-15 rs

Participation
Pattern
.

;

rs

16 +

o~s

rs

Minorities
16 + rs
rs

6-15

Com. Only

o·

9.0

5.5

26.9

13.6

8.0

Vote Only

30.8

4LO

42.2

24.3

34.1

32.0

69.2

50~0

52.3

48.8

52.3

60.0

Coin.

+

Vote

..

100%(26) . 100%(22)

100~(109)

100%(41) _100%(44)

.

100%(25)
.

The· results in Table 4C confirm our hunch that combining the effects of
ethnicity and length of residence would add a new dimension to the analysis of
participation s_tyle among participants.

It is particularly noteworthy that

.none of the newly-arriving white activists are communal specialists, while about
27%

of minority newly arriving activists are.

As time goes by white activists

become increasingly spec1a11zed to voting and there is a slight increase in the
.

.··

.

.

.

'

.

.

..

number of cofl111luna1 activists in their rank. The proportion of white activists
•

<

'

'.

•

•

•

who participate
in both communal activitY
and voting actually
declines
·over. time, .
..
.
.
.
.

.

.

.

i.e., from 69.2% to 52.3%. ,Minority activists, on the other.hand, follow a different pattern.

The proportion of activists who are communal specialists declines
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rapidly over time while voting specialization increases moderately as does the
proportion of minority activists who perform both voting and communal acts~
As 'predicted, long~r-t_erm white :activists are more likely to specialize· in
voting than minorfty activists (i.e., 42% to 32%.) · ·
So far the empirical support for Hypothesis #4 has been mixed.
.

.

.

.

\

For example,

'

newly arriving minority activists are only slightly more likely to specialize
in communal activity than voting (26.9% to 24.3%; respectively). ·on the more

positive s.ide, there is aboµt an 18% difference in voting specia·1 ization between'
long-term white resident activists and their short-term minority counterparts
(42.2% to 24.3%, respectively). · In fact,' in all residence categories white

activists are ~ore likely to specialize in vbting.
But the focus on participa:rits only has tended to' obscure the fact that a
much greater proportion of whites
·
. actually vote •.. B'ased on a probability
..
.

.

.

.

sample of. the neighborhood, we estimate that approximately. 45%' of the. neighborhood population is of Whfte Eur.bpean background. · Us.ing our own sample (the
•

•

•

?

•

•

Ethnic Block survey sampl~) to .estimate the white percentage of the voting
population shows that While whites comprise approximately 45%. of the area's
populat1on, they consti.tute at least 70% of the area's voters. One reason, of
course, for the lower percentage of minority voters is the large proportion of
noncitizens among the hispanics·.

About 40% of minorities in general, and 65.4%

o'f the Cuban and 82% of the Dominicans are not U.S. citizens.
cannot fully account
for lower'minority
rates.
.
.
.
.
.
'

'

.

.

But citizenship

Even when U.S. citizenship is

controlled for only 60. 3% of the minority group members have, Vbted in a recent,
'

'

'

local election compared to 85.1% of the white citizens.· It is also true that
.· .. as length of resi'dence increases for minority citizens, the voting gap between
them and white citizens narrows, but it is not completely eliminated .. Among

new arrivals, 78.8% of the white citizens vote compared to 49.2% of the minority
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citizens; among longer-term residents 88,8% of the white citizens but only 74.2%
of the minority citizens vote. ·Thus, even though voting rates for longer term
white and minority activists are essentially the same (94. 5% to 92 .8%), the fact
I

',

that longer term white residents vote more than their.minority counterparts means
.

'

that whites will continue to excercise voting power that is disproportionate to
their shaie 6f:the neighborhood population.
Hypothesis #5: Blacks will be especially 1ikely to participate in communal
I

polHical activity.· They will· also vote more often than hispanics; thus, differences in voting levels will exist between minority groups.
The assu~pti~n that blacks ~111 exhibit differenct participation patterns
than other minority ~roups 1s based on the fact that simultaneous with the ~Jar
on Poverty, black civil 'rights 'leaders and organizations have placed great
emphasis on gaining access to the electoral ~ranchise.

We expect that the

salience granted to voting will translate into higher voting rates for blacks
.· when c~mpared to .hispani.cs •. Table 5A presents the voting rates for black and·
hispanic citizens,. and for comparative purposes the voting rates of specific
white ethhic groups.

Table 5A

Vote d

J ews

Yes

.85,3

Voted in Recent Loca 1 Election by Ethnic
Identification (N~326) (in%)
0th.
Tot.
.
'h
Europ,
White
Bl ac k
Cb
I r1s
u .
91.1

78.4

85.1

Dom

PR

Tot.
H'1sp.

66.7

74.1

27.3

52

55.7

33.3

25.9

72. 7

48

44.3

100%

100%
{27)

100% .100%

100%

(11)

(88)

..

No

14,7
"

8,9

21.6 · ·

i4.9.

100%(68) 100%(56} l00J(51 ~ 100%(175)

I

~63)

(50)

i ,_

The most stocking thing about the data displayed in Table 5A is the extraordinarily wide variation 1n vot1ng levels between fndiv1dual ethnic groups.
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the product of a realistic alienation from formal politics -- only protest and/
or community organization is a useful vehicle for the accomplishment of the
social goals of poorer people.

There has been considerable debate over the

programmatic utility of voting, and we will not add to that argument at this
point.

Rather, we wish to engage with the feelings of the participants (and

non-participants) themselves.
Our data permit an examination not only of the forms of political participation engaged in our research neighborhood, they also allow us to investigate
the attitudes toward the electoral process that its residents hold.

Our sixth

hypothesis is that:
Hypothesis #6: Minority group members will not differ significantly from whites
in their beliefs about the ~ff~ctiveness of voting; strong majorities of non,

'

'

I

'

voting minorities wil1 also believe that voting is effective.
It "can be argued that minority group niembers exhibit low voting rates simply
because they feel that the government in general and the electoral system in
particular are unresponsive to their needs.

Rather than being mobilized to

communal partjcipation and voting by War on Poverty type programs, blacks and
hispanics make a conscious choice not to vote, since it is seen as inefficacious
for them. 11
This explanation of low voting rates among minorities runs counter to our
own.

We have .maintained that whites (and older whites in particular) vote

often ~ecause they were sodal iied to politics 1n a machine-dominated era ,when
a strong connection could .be drawn between voting and concrete benefits that
might accrue to neighborhood residents. Thus, whites of an earlier era drew
11.

For a critique of this view, see Char1es Ham11ton, "Political Costs and
· Benefits of Participation," in Herrfogton Bryce (ed.) Urban Governance
and M1nori!ies (New York: Praeger, 1976) pp. 146-150).

I
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a link between voting and the accountability of elected officials.
-Two questions from the Ethnic Block Survey will aid in testing the
"alienation thesis."

The first reads as follows:

"How much do you feel that

having elections makes the government in New York City pay attention to what
people think--a good deal, some, not very much, or not at all?"

Table 6A

below reports the answers to this question, broken down by ethnic ·group membership:.
Table 6A
_Perceived Influence of Elections On Local Government
Sy Ethn'ic Group Membership (N=434} (in %)
Perceived
Influence

Wh.ites

Minorities

High

28.0

32.5

Moderate

37.4

36.1

low

28.6

18. 7

6.0

12.7

·e:.

I

Very Low

· 100% (182)

~

100% (252}

The data in;Table 6Aprovide strong support for our contention that
-

-

"alienafion" is not a prime source for lower voting rates among minorities
~

than whites.

.

.

Minoritiei are 9 1f anything, slightly more positive than ~hites
'

1

·1 ••

in their assessment of the impact of local elections although the differences
are not large.

Minorities are more likely to give a high rating to elections

but also slightly more likely to give a very 1ow ·rating.

Both are equally

,1 i kely to rate elections as. moderately effective, whereas whites· are somewhat

•

more likely to rate them as 1ow (i.e., 28.6% to 18.7%, resp~ctively).

In short,

the data in Table 6A do not lead to the concluston-that minorities are especially
a1i ena-ted when compared to whites .

I
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The second question from the Ethnic Block Survey focuses more specifically
on the act of voting.

Responde~ts were presented with nine different strategies

for attempting to influence New York City Government, one of which was

11

v·oting. •·

The question reads as follows: "There are many ways that people may try to in-

fluence the government in New York City.
attempt to do this.

Here are several ways that people

Which of these ways do you think would be effective? ... Do

you think that voting would be effective?"

Table 6B reports the· results broken

down by ethnic group membership:
Table 6B
Perceived Effectiveness.of Local Voting
By Ethnic Group Membership (N-434) (in%)
Voting
Effective

Whites

Minorities

Yes

87.4

88.9

No

12.6

11.1
100% (252)

100% (182)

Gamma= .... 067
The findings in Table 6B are clearly consistent with the data in Table 6A.

Overwhelming majorities of whites and minorities perceive voting as

an

effective

strategy for influencing local government, and differences between whites and
' i

minorities prove to be insignificant.

When U.S. citizens were isolat~d for

analysis the findings were essentially the same: 87.4% of the minority citizens
thought voting was effective, compared to 86.9% of the white citizens.

'

Citizen-

ship, then had no influence on our findings.
Before concluding this section of the paper, it might prove useful to explore
possible differences between voters and nonvoters in their perceptions of the
effectiveness of voting.

If the "alienation thesis 11 is valid, one would expect

nonvoters to be much less likely to believe in the effectiveness of voting than
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voters.

Table 6C displays data on the perceived effectiveness of voting,

broken down by ethnic group membership and whether the respondent has recently
Once again only U.S. citizens are included in the

voted in a local election.
data:

Table 6C
'1

Perceived Effectiveness of Local Voting By
Recent Voting, Controlling for Ethnic Group
Membership (N=326) (in%)
Voting
Effective

Whites
Voter

Minorities

Nonvoter

Voter

Nonvoter

Yes

87.9

80.8

92.3

80,0

No

12.1

19.2

7.7

20.0

;

100%. (149)

100% (26)

Part. Gamma=.268

100% (91)

100%

(60)

Part. Gamma=.500

Although the above data provide some support for the alienation thesis,
the ~vidence is not strong.

It is true that ·nonvoters are less favorably

disposed toward voting than voters; but nonvoting whites and minorities are
equally likely to support voting as an effective strategy (89.8% to 80%
respectively).

The fact that about 80% of the nonvoters (minority or other-

wise) believe that local voting is effective suggests that alienation is not
a major factor in explaining nonvoting.
· An examination of the findings of this section of the paper tends to confirm the assertions made in Hypothesis ~6.

Strong majorities of both white and

minority residents express support for the efficacy of· vo·ting.

That n1inority

group members tend to vote less frequently than whites cannot therefore be
simply a function of alienation.
c!.

Nor can it be only the result of the low SES

levels of minority groups, since there are major differences between minori_ty
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groups in voting levels.
These variations demonstrate how wide a gap there can be between perceptions
of the utility of a political act and actual use·of it.

What has been shown

is that there is a broad consensus on the utility of voting in our test neighborhood, but considerable intergroup variat16n in actual use of the franchise.
This gap reinforces our view of the need to examine the incentives for
participation in order to gain a clearer understanding of variations in participation.

Our ·theoretical argument suggests such an explanation, and our ex-

amination of "alienation" counter-explanations leads us to reject them.
(H) Conc1 us ion

At the outset of this paper we outlined a variety of theories which have
been advanced to account for neighborhood deterioration in American cities.

We then suggested an additional urban-political explanation. We have presented
11

11

data which provides a partial test of the validity of our explanation.

Although

this particular paper only examines the attitudes of rank-and-file citizens,
we have shown that these attitudes take a form consistent with our theory.

Our theory suggests that the existence of attitudes such as those described
here changes the incentive systems which operate for local elected off1cials. 12
_ In future studies we hope to show that local politicc!_l__ elites are_~g_g_~izant of
these factors, and do take advantage of the patterns of perverse incentives"
11

which we have described,

It is not our suggestion that this perspective pro-

vides the sole explanation for our current urban problems, but we are arguing
12. These problems ~re particularly acute when we are considering t~e- relationships between white elected officials and minority populations. For a
description of the variation in white offic1als perceptions of this
rela,t1onsh1p See Andrew Glassbergp ''Precinct Campaigning in an Urban
Ghettotu 1n David Abbott and Edward Rogowsky (eds.) Po11t1ca1 Parties
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971). Pp. 139-159.
1

<II
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that any attempt to deal comprehensively with our urban difficulties needs to
take a realistic look at the problems raised in this research.
· It has been our contention that one aspect of neighborhood deterioration,

often unrecognized, is the variation in participation between new and old
neighborhood residents. · Rather than seeing this variation as simply a product
of differences in socio-economic status, or of a conscious .choice not to participate in irrelevant institutions, we have argued that the political structure
11

11

of a community matters.
Particularly ·1n ward-based po.1itica1 systems, there is a problem in
motivating·participation of,new arrivals in the post-machine era.

The United

States does not mandate participation in elections, and when the local political
structure does not provide any specific stimuli for participation, it may simply

atrophy.

In a nation where approximately 20% of the population moves every year,

we need to be p~rticularly attentive to the motivations (or lack of motivations)

not only for initial political participation, but for continued participation
(and voter re-registration) following each move.

What is suggested in this

paper, is that these incentives are weak for poor new arrivals in changfog urban ne1ghborhoods.
The data presented here suggest that new arrivals do behave differently in
their political participation from older community residents.

Buildfog on

this finding, we have suggested that elected officials t~ke note of this nonparticipation, and' that their own incentive systems change as a result. 13
Future work wi 11 present evidence in the behaviors of these 01 nei ghborhood e1i tes. 11

13. For a discussion of the uses (and limitations) of protest activity not

directly t1ed to the use of the vote~ see M1chael Lipsky, Prot_es.t in Cii;t
. Pol~ (Chicago, Rand McNallyp 1970). It is our contention, of cour·se,
. that in the types of neighborhoods we describe, m1nor1ty groups need not
be "relatively powerless/ (Lipskyp p. 181) but could be using the vote
more effectively if rates of participation among new arrivals were greater.
1
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._ ....

While we have refrained from specific policy suggestions in th·is paper, it is
obvious that we think that any program aimed at reversing neighborhood deterioration should be sensitive to the need for providing incentives to neighborhood residents to participate in the formal electoral process.

This would be

the best check on the pattern of "perverse incentives 11 which we believe operates
now in many American cities.
At least since James Madison, political scientists have understood the
need to have institutional forms structured in such a way so that the ambition
of political elites operates constructively.

It.

is our contention that the

pattern of attitudes and actions described in thii paper mikes the ambition of
1ocal elected officials operat~ in a socially count~rproduttive wriy.

Rather

than attempt to elimina'te such ambition, Madison advised us, we ought to
restructure our 1nstitut1-0ns,
"ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest
of the man must be~onnect~d with the constitutiorial rights
of the place. \
4
This advice seems to us to be as valid today for American cities as it was
1

almost two hundred years ago for the nation as a whole .

.
14. James Madison, ''Federalist #51, 11 1n Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,

.

John Jay, The Federalist (edited by Benjamin Wright) (Cambridge: Harvard
Unive-rsity Press,· 1961) p. 356,
··
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